Atkins v. Commonwealth
510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 21
Spring 3-1-1999
Atkins v. Commonwealth 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va.
1999)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, Va. Supreme Ct. is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Atkins v. Commonwealth 510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999), 11 Cap. DEF J. 401 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol11/iss2/21
Atkins v. Commonwealth
510 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1999)
L Facts
On the afternoon of August 16, 1996, Daryl Atkins and William Jones
were at the home of Atkins drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana.'
Later that evening, Atkins, armed with a handgun, and Jones walked to a
nearby convenience store to buy more beer. Once in the parking lot of the
store, Atkins told Jones that he did not have enough money to purchase
anything and would panhandle to get more money.2 Thereafter, the pair
proceeded to abduct Eric Nesbitt, a patron of the store. The pair drove
Nesbitt into a field and Atkins allegedly shot and killed him.3
During the investigation which followed the incident, Atkins made a
statement to Investigator Frederick Lyons, in which Atkins claimed Jones
was the one who shot Nesbitt.4 At trial, however, the jury found Atkins
guilty of capital murder.' During the penalty trial, the Commonwealth
sought to prove both the future dangerousness aggravating factor and the
vileness aggravating factor. Atkins presented the testimony of Dr. Evan
Stuart Nelson, a forensic psychologist, who testified that Atkins had an
intelligence quotient ("IQ") of fifty-nine. Based on this score, Nelson stated
that Atkins was "mildly mentally retarded."6 The jury found the existence
of both the future dangerousness and vileness aggravating factors, and
sentenced Atkins to death.' After the judge imposed the sentence,' Atkins
appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, presenting nineteen assignments
of error.
1. The opinion cited to in this article is the original opinion of the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which was handed down on January 8, 1999. On February 26, 1999, the Supreme
Court of Virginia handed down a revised opinion. At the time of publication of this article,
this opinion was not yet available in any reporter or on any electronic database. The opinion
can be found at < http://www.courts.state.va.us/txtops/1981477.txt > on the Supreme Court
of Virginia website.
2. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 449 (Va. 1999).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 454.
5. Id. at 451.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 452.
8. Id. at 453.
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II. Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that several of the assignments of
error had not been briefed, six of the claims had been previously decided by
the court, and five other claims were without merit. The court held, how-
ever, that the use of an incorrect verdict form was reversible error with
respect to the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the court
affirmed Atkins's conviction of capital murder, but overturned the sentence
of death and remanded the case to the trial court for a new penalty proceed-
ing.9
III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
This case is something of a landmark in recent Virginia capital case
history. With the exception of penalty trial relief mandated by the decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Simmons v. South Carolina,"
this case marks only the third reversal by the Virginia Supreme Court since
1990.11
A. Batson Claim
9. Id. at 453-57. The court's disposition of several of Atkins's claims will not be
discussed further in this article, for they provide no new insight on capital defense law in
Virgima. These claims are briefly identified below.
The Virginia Supreme Court dismissed some issues it had previously decided in other
cases. These issues included challenges to the constitutionality of the Virginia death penalty
statutes and a challenge to the trial court's failure to grant Atkins additional peremptory
strikes. Id. at 453.
Atkins claimed error in the trial court's denial of his motion in limine to have a sample
of blood taken from Jones or, in the alternative, to limit the prosecution's presentation of
DNA testing of blood found at the scene of the crime. The court ruled that this testing was
not necessary to his defense, and that Atkins did not demonstrate that the denial of the tests
was materially prejudicial to his case. Id. at 453-54.
The court also noted that in Atkins's opening brief, counsel had modified the order and
phrasing of his assignments of error from his original designation of the assignments under
Virginia Supreme Court Rule 5.22(b). The court noted that it would only discuss the original
assignments of error. Id. at 453. The court also ruled that it would not discuss any assign-
ments of error which had not been briefed. It is important for defense counsel to be aware
of this rule and be sure that those assignments of error listed in the Rule 5.22(b) designation
are also briefed and that all assignments counsel wishes to pursue are listed in the Rule 5.22(b)
designation.
10. 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (where future dangerousness is at issue and state law prohibits
parole if the defendant is sentenced to life in prison, due process requires that the jury be
informed-either by instruction or argument of counsel-that the only alternative to a death
sentence is a life sentence without possibility of parole).
11. The other two reversals were based on insufficiency of triggerman evidence. See




Based on Batson v. Kentucky,12 Atkins challenged the Commonwealth's
peremptory strike of a nineteen-year-old black female. The juror was
questioned by the trial court, the Commonwealth, and Atkins's counsel,
and denied ever having been the victim of a past crime." The Common-
wealth used one of its peremptory strikes to remove her, first claiming that
the juror's age was the race neutral reason for the strike, and later claiming
that the juror had been untruthful because she had been a victim of a crime.
The Commonwealth produced an offense report showing that she was the
complaining witness in a grand larceny complaint. The trial court and the
Supreme Court of Virginia both accepted the latter reason. 4
The court correctly focused on the subjective reason for the peremp-
tory strike, as required by Batson. This case is further evidence that any
race-neutral reason, however implausible, will be accepted by Virginia
courts. Challenges on this basis will not succeed. However, when, as here,
factual assertions are made or evidence is presented by the prosecution in
support of a race-neutral reason, it may be possible to obtain an evidentiary
hearing to test the validity or establish the context of the factual assertion.
It may then in turn be possible to assert that, had the prosecutor known the
truth in context, the strike would not have been made. The value of such
a hearing or procedure is more tactical than substantive. At the very least,
it slows down or disrupts what is too often a hurried process of jury selec-
tion.
B. Verdict Forms-Grounds for Reversal
After all of the penalty phase evidence had been received, the trial court
and counsel considered jury instructions and the verdict form. The Com-
monwealth's draft of the verdict form did not give the jury the option to
impose a life sentence upon a finding of neither aggravating circumstance
and, accordingly, Atkins's counsel wanted to use his form which "[gave] the
jury every option."1" After redrafting, the prosecutor represented that its
verdict form was the same as that of the defense counsel. Atkins's counsel
agreed and said that the forms were "pretty close" to the same.16 However,
the Commonwealth's verdict form still did not provide the jury the option
to impose only a life sentence and a fine if neither aggravating factor was
12. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that potential jurors may not be peremptorily stricken
on the basis of their race and that if a defendant can make out a prima facie case that the juror
was struck on the grounds of race, the state must assert a race-neutral reason for the strike).
13. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 448.
14. Id.




proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court used the Common-
wealth's verdict form.17
On appeal, Atkins asserted that the jury was not properly instructed
during the penalty phase of his trial because the verdict form failed to
provide the jury with the option to sentence Atkins to life imprisonment
upon finding the existence of neither aggravating factor. The Supreme
Court of Virginia agreed with Atkins and reversed the death sentence. s The
court ruled that normally a trial court is under no duty to alter or correct
an instruction which contains a misstatement of law, however, "when thd
principal of law is materially vital to [a] defendant.., it is reversible error
for the trial court to refuse a defective instruction instead of correcting it
and giving it in the proper form." 9 The court held that a proper verdict
form "is materially vital to the defendant in a criminal case,"2 and over-
turned the death sentence on that ground."
This ruling is helpful, but also somewhat puzzling. It is clear that
counsel should ensure that all possible sentencing options are on the verdict
form submitted to the jury,22 be it the Commonwealth's verdict form or
17. Id.
18. Id. at 455-56.
19. Id. at 456 (quoting Whaley v. Commonwealth, 200 S.E.2d 556, 558 (Va. 1973)).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. For a verdict formwhich does list all possible jury sentencing options, see VIRGINIA
MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, No. 33.122 (1998), or contact the Virginia Capital
Case Clearinghouse. The jury verdict form submitted in Atkins's case read as follows:
We the ju, on the issue joined, having foundthe defendant gu'lty of the capital
murder of victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from statute and
having unanimously found after consideration of his history and background that
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continiing threat to society,
and
having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is outra-
geously or wanto ly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved aggravatedbattery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish tMe act of
murder or depravity of mind and having considered the evidence in mitigation
of the offense, unaiimously ix his punishment at death.
Foreman "
OR
We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the capital
murder of victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from statuteland
having unanimously found after consideration of his history and background that
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society,
and
having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the offense is outra-
geousry or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved aggravatedbattery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of
murder or depravity of mind and having considered the evidence in mitigation
of the offense, unaiimously fix his punishment at life imprisonment and a fine
of
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the defense's verdict form. Further, the court's broad language regarding
the material vitality of proper verdict forms to criminal defendants may be
the announcement of a broader principle. Creative advocacy may convince
Foreman
OR
We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the capital
murder of victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from statutel and
having unanimously found after consideration of his history and background that
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society and havin considered the evidence in
mitigation of the offense, unanimously Iix his punishment at death.
Foreman
OR
We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the capital
murder of17victim's name] occurring, ii the [offense provision from statuteT and
having unanimously found after consideration of his hfistory and background that
there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society and having considered the evidence in
mitigation of the offense, unanimously ix his punishment at life imprisonment
and a fine of_ .
Foreman
OR
We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the capital
murder of victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from statutejand
having unanimously found that his conduct in comiitting the offense is outra-
geousy or wanto nly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved aggravated
batte ry to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish te act of
murder or depravity of mind and having considered the evidence in mitigation
of the offense, unaiimously Ni his punishment at death.
Foreman
OR
We the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the
capital murder of [victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from
statute] and having unanimously found that his conduct in committing the
offense is outrageously or wantoily vile horrible or inhuman in that it involved
aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder or depravity of mind and having considered the evidence in
mitigation of the offense, unanimously Iix his punishment at life imprisonment
and a fine of
Foreman
[The following provision was the seventh option which was absent from the
verdict form submitted to the jury, but was on Atkins's counsel's form, and
resulted in the court's reversal:] OR
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty of the capital
murder of [victim's name] occurring in the [offense provision from the statute]
and having considered the evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the offense
unanimously fix his punishment at life imprisonment and a fine of
Foreman




the court of other "materially vital" principles. For example, proper jury
instructions have been deemed "essentials of a fair trial."23
Also unusual in the disposition of this issue is that the court passed up
chances to find the verdict form claim defaulted or to find the error result-
ing from the improper form to be harmless. Grounds for defaulting the
claim included untimely objection to the use of the form,24 failure to specifi-
cally make an assignment of error regarding the entire jury form, and stating
in court that the verdict form was "pretty close" to being correct. Further,
the court could have found any error resulting from the improper verdict
form to be harmless error because the jury did find the existence of both
aggravating factors. The court's failure to address these potential bars to
Atkins's verdict form claim25 also suggests that perhaps the court had other
unannounced reasons for overturning the death sentence.
C Execution of Mentally Retarded Defendants
Atkins's also asserted that under section 17-1.313 of the Virginia
Code,26 the sentence of death was disproportionate or excessive as compared
to other cases similar to that of Atkins.' Atkins primarily relied on the fact
that he was mentally retarded and had an I.Q. of only fifty-nine. Since the
court had already determined that the death sentence would be overturned
on the basis of the improper verdict form, the court ruled in its original
decision that it was not necessary to rule on this claim.2" On February 26,
1999, the Supreme Court of Virginia, after granting the Commonwealth's
petition for rehearing, handed down an amended decision in the Atkins case.
In the court's revised opinion, the only change made was to eliminate any
discussion of mentally retarded defendants beyond stating Atkins's claim
that the death sentence was disproportionate, and holding that it was unnec-
essary to decide the issue given the court's disposition on the jury verdict
form claim.
In its original decision, the court did address the mental retardation
issue raised by Atkins, stating that it is "likely to have relevance on re-
23. See Darnell v. Commonwealth, 370 S.E.2d 717, 719 (Va. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
Dowdy v. Commonwealth, 255 S.E.2d 506 (Va. 1979)). See also Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11
CAP. DEF. J. 463 (1999) (analyzing Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998)).
24. Defense counsel did not object to the use of the Commonwealth's verdict form
until the sentencing hearing, after the jury had recommended a sentence.
25. The trial court addressed both issues, holding that Atkins's objection to the use of
the improper form was untimely, and even if the objection had been timely, the issue was
moot because the jury found the existence of both aggravating factors.
26. VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 1998).




mand."2 9 The court ruled that the trial court should have "instructed the
jury to consider all the mitigating evidence including Atkins's mental
retardation."" In its original decision, the court also took the further
unusual step of directing that, at the new sentencing hearing, the jury is to
be instructed that if it wishes it may consider and give effect to the mitigat-
ing evidence of the defendant's mental retardation.31 The court cited the
Supreme Court case of Penry v. Lynaugh2 for this proposition. Finally, the
court declined to address Atkins's claim that the Eighth Amendment bars
execution of the mentally retarded because it was not "certain that the death
penalty will be imposed on Atkins on remand.""
It is difficult to assess the court's action in granting the Common-
wealth's petition for rehearing in this case. The revised opinion deleted all
of the original directions on mental retardation it had mandated for the new
sentencing hearing. In spite of the revised opinion, it is possible that some
members of the court are increasingly concerned about the execution of the
mentally retarded. Even though Penry explicitly did not bar execution of
the mentally retarded as a class, it is important to recognize and develop for
judge and jury the significance of this condition.
In the wake of Penry, Virginia added mental retardation to its statutory
list of mitigating factors.3" Consequently, it is important to know how to
determine if a client is mentally retarded, how to distinguish mental retarda-
tion from mental illness, and how to make the most effective use of mitiga-
tion. Also, it is important to note the Penry Court's acknowledgment of
lessened culpability for mentally retarded defendants. This is particularly
true if Atkins is an indication, however tentative, of increased interest from
the Supreme Court of Virginia in mentally retarded defendants.3"
Because mental retardation is mitigating evidence, it is important that
defense counsel understand how to determine if his client is mentally
retarded. Mental retardation, especially mild mental retardation, is often
not manifested by any physical signs or appearances. Many mentally
retarded defendants appear perfectly normal, both physically and in some
aspects of social interaction. Because of the normal appearance of such
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989)).
31. Id.
32. 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
33. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
34. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1998).
35. For further discussion of mental retardation, its characteristics, and its effect on the
criminal system, see James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414 (1985). For a discussion of how to spot mental
retardation in a defendant and the number and types of experts needed to verify mental
retardation and aid in its presentation, see Silvia L. Simpson, Confessions and the Mentally
Retarded Criminal Defendant: Cheating to Lose, CAP. DEF. J., Spring 1994, at 28.
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defendants, counsel should pay particular attention, during interviews and
consultations with the client, for signs of mental retardation. 6 After inter-
viewing the client, counsel should look to defendant's medical, psychologi-
cal, educational, and/or employment history for any further evidence of
mental retardation. Finally, friends, family, teachers, and other people from
the defendant's past may be able to provide anecdotal accounts of the
defendant's mental retardation.
It is also worth noting that the viability of the determination in Penry,
pursuant to Trop v. Dulles,37 that there is no national societal consensus38
against execution of the mentally retarded, may be weakening. At the time
Penry was decided, only two states39 specifically banned execution of the
mentally retarded, in addition to fourteen states which outlawed capital
punishment completely. Since the Penry decision, ten more states have
categorically banned the execution of the mentally retarded,4" while twelve
states presently have no death penalty. While these numbers may not reach
the level of a national societal consensus against execution of the mentally
retarded,41 these numbers do signify a significant state trend against execu-
tion of the mentally retarded. Perhaps as this trend continues, the Penry
determination that execution of the mentally retarded does not violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment will
come into question.
D. Exclusion of Defendant's Hearsay Testimony
36. Such signs may include confusion, inconsistency, defensive reactions to difficult
questions, and difficulty reading and writing.
37. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) (holding that what the Eighth Amend-
ment forbids at any given time is to be judged by "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society").
38. The national societal consensus standard requires that some number of states outlaw
the execution of a certain class of defendants before the Supreme Court will find that the
.evolving standards of decency" mentioned in Trop have evolved such that the Eighth
Amendment would ban execution of that class. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
(holding that a national societal consensus existed against execution of the insane, where
twenty-six states had specifically outlawed such executions, and the other twenty-four states
had adopted the common law prohibition against the death penalty for the insane).
39. The two states were Georgia and Maryland.
40. The ten states are Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, Tennessee, and Washington. Also, the United States Congress has
outlawed imposition of the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants in federal cases.
21 U.S.C. 5 848(1) (1998).
41. InStanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989),Justice Scalia refused to find a national
societal consensus against execution of defendants aged sixteen where only fifteen states
outlawed such practices. Id at 370-73. Scalia pointed out that in other cases, no less than 42
states were sufficient to find a national societal consensus. Id
[Vol. 11:2
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Atkins asserted that the trial court had erred when it failed to admit a
statement Atkins had made to Investigator Lyons. In the statement, Atkins
inculpated himself in the events of the night of August 16, but had stated
that Jones was the one who actually fired the gun and killed Nesbitt.42
Under section 18.2-18 of the Virginia Code, only the person who actually
kills the victim, i.e., "pulls the trigger," may be tried for capital murder.43
Accomplices to a capital murder may not be tried for capital murder except
in murder-for-hire cases.'" Atkins's counsel tried to enter the statement
during the cross-examination of Lyons and the Commonwealth objected.
The trial court upheld the objection, holding that the statement was hear-
say. Atkins argued that the statement came under the declaration against
penal interest exception to hearsay. The trial court rejected this claim,
though, stating that Atkins's statement was "self-serving" and not against
penal interest.4" The court reasoned that the statement freed Atkins from
"triggerman" status, thereby reducing his criminal liability to first degree
murder." The statement was later admitted when Atkins took the stand
and referred to his prior statement.4"
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that since the statement was
ultimately admitted, there were no grounds for Atkins's appeal of the
upheld objection. Further, the court stated that "there is no merit to
Atkins's assertion that his prior statement should have been admitted during
Lyons's testimony. "" The court based this ruling on the fact that to estab-
lish the against penal interest hearsay exception, the declarant must be
unavailable to testify.49 Since Atkins was available to testify, but had not yet
taken the stand, the court ruled that the exception would not have applied."0
The court's ruling on this claim is difficult to reconcile with its recent
decision in a nearly identical situation in Lilly v. Commonwealth."1 In Lilly,
Mark Lilly, brother and accomplice of the capital defendant Benjamin Lilly,
made a statement to police officers that inculpated himself in the events
surrounding the murder which the two had committed. Specifically, Mark
named Benjamin Lilly as the triggerman. At trial, the Commonwealth
sought to introduce the statement during the testimony of the police officer
42. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 454 (Va. 1999).
43. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-18 (Michie 1998).
44. Id.
45. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 454.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 455.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Ellison v. Commonwealth, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688 (Va. 1978)).
50. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 455.
51. 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va.), cert. granted sub nom. Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 443 (1998).
See also Matthew Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 207 (1998) (analyzing Lilly v.
Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998)).
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to whom Mark Lilly made the statement. The trial court admitted it, and
the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the admission on the grounds that
Mark Lilly's statement was a declaration against penal interest. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia ruled that Mark Lilly met the unavailability
requirement because he was a defendant in his own first degree murder trial
and could therefore maintain the Fifth Amendment privilege not to incrimi-
nate oneself, thus making him unavailable. 2 The court further accepted
Mark Lilly's statement as against penal interest, though it was as identically
"self-serving" as the statement made by Atkins.
If Mark Lilly was unavailable to testify because he had a Fifth Amend-
ment right to not incriminate himself, then Atkins was just as unavailable
because at the point his statement was to be entered, during the testimony
of Lyons, he had not yet waived his Fifth Amendment right and taken the
stand. The situation presented in Lilly is identical to Atkins's situation, with
the only, and obviously dispositive, difference between the two cases being
that in Lilly the Commonwealth was seeking to prove capital murder and
in Atkins the defendant was trying to disprove capital murder. The Su-
preme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in Lilly, so some
resolution of this problem is forthcoming. One hopes for even-handed
application of whatever rule is announced.
Jason J. Solomon
52. Id. at 533-34.
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